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FOURTH AMENDMENT-REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
Last Term the Supreme Court further delineated
the scope of protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. In Rakas v. Illinois' the Court
held that passengers in an automobile do not have
standing to object to a search and seizure where
they assert no possessory or property interest in
either the auto or the items seized and do not show
that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the area searched. In Delaware v. Prousi2 the
Court held that absent an "articulable and reason-
able suspicion" of a violation of the law by a
motorist or passenger, stopping and detaining a
motorist to check his license and registration is
unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. Rakas and Prouse involved automo-
bile searches and seizures and both were subjected
to similar analysis by the Court. Nonetheless, the
holdings seem surprisingly different.
Historically, the automobile has been afforded
special treatment under the fourth amendment.3
439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
2 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979).
3 In Carroll v. United States, the Court held that a
warrantless search of an automobile could be made where
the officer had reasonable or probable cause to believe
the automobile was being used to illegally transport
liquor. In his opinion, ChiefJustice Taft commented that
there was a lower standard of reasonableness for searching
an automobile than for other places since, due to its
mobility, the automobile might be gone by the time a
search warrant could be obtained. 267 U.S. 132, 153-55
(1925). Since then, reasonable suspicion has been held
sufficient for stopping an auto, though probable cause is
apparently still required for searching it, unless it falls
under a special exception to the warrant rule. See note 4
infra. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1977), the Court recognized that there was a diminished
expectation of privacy in an automobile because it is not
designed to hold personal effects and it is subject to
extensive governmental regulation. The following opin-
ions are indicative of the lesser protection afforded auto-
mobiles in the past: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 561 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,
590 (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 440 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Cool-
idge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) (plu-
The automobile search is one of the few exceptions4
to the rule that "warrantless searches arc per se
unreasonable." 5 Although an automobile is not
completely unprotected, it is afforded less fourth
amendment protection than a dwelling.6 The au-
rality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47
(1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S.
216, 221 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
366-67 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
177 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700
(1931).
4 There is a whole range of exceptions to the warrant
standard which are judged upon the basis of their reason-
ableness. No warrant is necessary where exigent circum-
stances such as possible escape or destruction of evidence
are present. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43
(1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
Searches and seizures incident to arrest require no war-
rant. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14;
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 455 (plurality
opinion); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963). Items in
plain view can be seized without a warrant. See Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 592; Air Pollution Control Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. at 43; Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57, 59 (1924). Warrantless searches of heavily regu-
lated industries are permitted. See United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970). Searches by
customs officials need no warrant. See United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). Searches can be made
on probable cause. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. at 458 (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. at 48-49; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at
170-71; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. at 700; Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. at 149. Inventory and car care
functions of police departments require no warrant. See
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370-71; Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
s Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55. See
also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 394; Cady v. Dom-
broski, 413 U.S. at 439; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528-29 (1967).
6 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1401; Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 n.10 (1978); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1971); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. at 177; Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. at 153. That is, unless the automobile is taken out
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tomobile exception was noted and weighed in the
decision in Rakas.7 Though the Court said petition-
ers still would have lost if the search had been of a
dwelling, the diminished expectation of privacy in
an automobile was seen as significant by both the
majority and the concurring opinions.8 In Prouse
the Court also noted the special fourth amendment
situation of automobiles.9 More importantly, the
automobile's inferior status was implicit in the
Court's application of a reasonable suspicion stan-
ard to the stopping of cars, rather than a more
stringent warrant or probable cause standard.
Rakas and Prouse are also comparable since sim-
ilar modes of analysis were used in them. This is
not readily apparent. At first glance, these decisions
appear to be contradictory because the Court has
not adopted a consistently liberal or consistently
narrow construction of the fourth amendment.
However, the Court did apply a similar balancing-
test analysis to the two fourth amendment cases.
Such analytical consistency might result in a deci-
sion in one case which appears philosophically
inconsistent with that in another case in the same
field. At any rate, these cases, particularly Rakas,
are important for the changes they have worked in
search and seizure law under the fourth and four-
teenth amendments.
RAKAs V. ILLINOIS
Petitioners were passengers in an automobile
matching the description of a robbery getaway car.
Police stopped the automobile, searched it, and
found a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger
seat and a box of rifle shells in the locked glove
compartment. Petitioners were charged with
armed robbery, and the seized items were admitted
as evidence against them. A motion to suppress the
items as fruits of an illegal search and seizure was
denied on the grounds that petitioners lacked
standing since they had never asserted a property
of the exception entirely because it does not have the
characteristics that make autos a special case in the first
place, i.e., if there is little chance an auto will be moved
before a warrant is obtained, then a warrant is needed.
See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. at 220-
21; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. at 367. But see
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
7439 U.S. at 148-49; id. at 153-55 (Powel,j., concur-
ring).
Justice Powell justified a different treatment for au-
tomobiles by noting that they operate in public, are
highly visible, and are extensively regulated. 439 U.S. at
154 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
999 S. Ct. at 1401.
interest in either the car or the seized items. Since
the trial court ruled that the petitioners lacked
standing, it never reached the question of whether
the police had probable cause to stop and search
the car. t Petitioners were convicted and the ap-
pellate court affirmed."
Justice Rehnquist wrote the five-member major-
ity opinion for the Court, affirming the conviction.
He addressed the petitioners' contention that as
the "targets" of the search and seizure, they should
be granted standing to assert fourth amendment
rights and, alternatively, that since they were, un-
der Jones v. United States,12 "legitimately present" in
the autombile, they should be granted standing.'
3
The Court rejected petitioners' target theory on
the grounds that it would loosen the rules for
standing far beyond their accustomed bounds and
would allow vicarious assertion of personal rights. 4
Justice Rehnquist pointed to the long line of cases
supporting the view that fourth amendment rights
are personal" and rejected petitioners' claim that
Jones conferred standing upon "one against whom
the search was directed." Instead, the Court
equated that phrase with the statement immedi-
ately preceding it, that "one must have been a
victim of a search and seizure."' 6 The Court refused
to equate "victim" with "target," and stated that
any target theory was impliedly rejected in Alder-
man v. United States.'7 The statements in Bumper v.
10 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130-3 1.
" Illinois v. Rakas, 46 III. App. 3d 569, 571-72, 360
N.E.2d 1252, 1253-54 (1977).
','362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960). Jones had been using
a friend's apartment, had a key to it, and kept clothes
there. The friend had been away for several days when
police burst in on Jones, searched the apartment, and
seized narcotics later introduced as evidence against
Jones. His motion to suppress was denied because he
failed to allege ownership of the contraband or a posses-
sor interest in the apartment. Id. at 259.
13 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 132.
14 Id. at 133-38. See generally O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
15 439 U.S. at 133-36 (citing Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261;
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
16439 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. at 261).
'7 439 U.S. at 135. The Court in Alderman stated that
only one whose rights were violated by an illegal wiretap
had standing to suppress, not one who was aggrieved
solely by the introduction in court of the frpits of the
wiretap. 394 U.S. at 171-72. See also id. at 188 n.1
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963).
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North Carolina18 and United States v. Jeffers'9 on which
petitioners relied, according to Justice Rehnquist,
were mere dicta since defendants in those cases had
not relied upon the target theory to establish stand-
ing.2
In response to petitioners' argument that, since
the exclusionary rule is deterrent in nature, they
should be allowed to contest arguably illegal
searches and seizures, the Court replied that ille-
gally seized evidence has never been ruled inad-
missible in all circumstances2' and opined that the
remedial nature of the rule required that it only be
employed in those instances where the benefits
outweigh the costs.2 The Court decided that there
was no reason to believe that a party whose fourth
amendment rights were infringed would not assert
his or her rights in criminal or civil court, thus
providing a sufficient deterrent to illegal police
action. In any case, additional complainants would
add only marginally to the protection of fourth
amendment rights.
23
Before turning to petitioners' second defense of
"legitimate presence" in the automobile, the Court
first altered the rule for analysis of standing under
the fourth amendment. The Court held that in the
future, courts should look to "the extent of a par-
ticular defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than ... [to] any theoretically
separate, but invariably intertwined concept of
standing.'
2 4
The Court then rejected the "legitimate pres-
ence"concept of Jones saying that it believed "the
18 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.I1 (1968).
'9 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
20 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 135-36.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 492.
22 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 134 n.3. The Court's
concern with the relative benefits derived from applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule is by no means a recent
phenomenon. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at
390 n.12, where the Court refused to consider whether
the deterrence rationale mandated exclusion of all evi-
dence seized illegally. Since then, the cases in note 21
supra have shown that the Court will balance the relative
benefits of application of the exclusionary rule against its
disadvantages to determine whether it should be applied.
23 439 U.S. at 134. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
24 439 U.S. at 139. What the Court seems to have done
is eliminate the preliminary "case or controversy" ques-
tion, see note 14 supra, and substitute a combined proce-
dural/substantive law test peculiar to fourth amendment
standing. For one circuit's interpretation of this rule, see
United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir.
1979).
phrase 'legitimately on premises' coined in Jones
creates too broad a gauge for measurement of
Fourth Amendment rights."2 5 The Court felt that
standing based upon legitimate presence would
permit any casual visitor to assert a fourth amend-
ment interest in a part of a house he had never
seen or assert such an interest on the dubious
grounds that he just happened to be there when
the search occurred. 26 The Court looked to Katz v.
United States27 for a broader test, more adaptable to
a balancing analysis, of whether defendant had a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" in the invaded
place.2s In so doing the Court specifically dis-
avowed any intention of tying fourth amendment
standing to ownership of the seized articles.29
Justice Rehnquist then answered Justice White's
dissenting criticism that a "bright line" test like
"legitimate presence" would be more workable
than a pure balancing test, asserting that which-
ever test was used, line drawing still would have to
be done. 0 Rehnquist noted that a "bright line"
test had led to results varying widely among juris-
dictions and contended that the "expectation of
privacy" concept would more faithfully serve anal-
ysis of fourth amendment issues.
3
'
The Court concluded that since petitioners had
not claimed either a possessory or property interest
in the articles seized or demonstrated any expec-
tation of privacy in the areas searched, the peti-
tioners could not claim protection under the fourth
amendment.2 The Court distinguished Rakas from
Jones and Katz since petitioners lacked control over
25 439 U.S. at 142.
2 Id. But see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 229;
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548 n.l1; Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. at 390.
27 389 U.S. at 353.
2 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 142. See United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7; United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971). See also Combs v. United States,
408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. at 191 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
29 439 U.S. at 142. But see Mr. Justice White's dissent
in Rakas. He claimed the Court was tying fourth amend-
ment standing to ownership of the seized article. Id. at
156-57 (White, J., dissenting). For the proposition that
rules of property and tort law should not control an
assertion of standing, see Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. at 191 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961);
and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 266.
3u 439 U.S. at 144.
3' Id. at 145 n.13.
32 Id. at 148-49. The Court pointed to the lesser pro-
tection afforded automobiles. See note 3 supra.
[Vol. 70
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the automobile and the areas searched.' Since they
normally would not be able to exclude others from
those areas, they could not legitimately expect
privacy there. Hence, the Court affirmed petition-
ers' conviction for armed robbery which had been
based on the seized evidence. '
Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice
Burger in a concurring opinion.35 Powell identified
the question at issue in Rakas as "whether one's
claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances. 16 He noted the pertinent factors to be
weighed: whether the defendant took normal pre-
cautions to ensure his privacy; how a defendant
had used a location; and whether the defendant
had a property interest in the area searched.1
7
Powell attributed the diminished expectation of
privacy one has in an automobile to its use in
public, its high visibility, and the extensive regu-
lation to which it is subject.'s He balanced these
factors, as well as those cited by the Court, and
:3 439 U.S. at 149.
:" Id. at 150. The Court characterized petitioners' fail-
tire to prevail here as a failure to assert "'that they had
any legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the
car which were searched." Id. at 149 n. 17. Though there
was -some warning that "expectation of privacy" should
be pleaded, it is unfortunate that petitioners may have
lost simply because they were unlucky enough to have
the Court change the rules on them at the last minute.
Fortunately, although they still lost. it appears that pe-
titioners had their side of the argument taken up for
them, and weighed by Powell inhis concurring opinion.
z"Id. at 150 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., con-
curring). Powell's concurring opinion is particularly im-
portant considering the split of the Court. Only'three
Justices limited themselves to Justice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion. Though Justice Powell and the ChiefJustice
joined in it, their concurring opinion substantially added
to it, making it clear that at least Powell and Burger
thought they were applying a normal balancing test, as
had been done in the probable cause/reasonable suspi-
cion cases. Faced with a solid fourJustice dissent, Powell's
opinion becomes important as the expression of two
essential swing votes.
' Id. at 152. This rule unfortunately gets into the
question of probable cause for the search, a question
Powell conceded was never addressed. Id. at 151. If this
was actually the rule applied by the majority, then maybe
the case should have been remanded for a determination
of probable cause so that all the factors in the "'balance
betwecn the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers" could be weighed to determine the reasonable.
ness or the search and seizure. Pennsylvania v. Mimms
434 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni.
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). See also Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 535.
J7 439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
38Id. at 154 n.2. Seealso note 3 supra.
found that the petitioners could not reasonably
expect "that the car in which they had been riding
would not be searched after they were lawfully
stopped and made to get out. ' 39 Justice Powell
then reiterated his support for the expectation of
privacy rule, which would allow all the many
variables to be weighed and balanced, unlike a
"bright line" rule like "legitimate presence."
' 0
Justice White dissented, expressing the views of"
four members of the Court. As had the majority,
White rejected petitioners' target theory of stand-
ing. However, he did accept petitioners' claim for
standing under an intersection of the doctrines
concerning searches and seizures of automobiles
and "legitimate expectation of privacy.,
41
Taking up the rules for automobiles first, White
pointed to the line of precedent adjudicating the
fourth amendment rights of persons who were the
victims of searches and seizures of automobiles
though they had no possessory or property interests
in those autos.42 White found it anomalous that
the Court now, in a factually similar situation,
claimed that petitioners had no standing.
43
White then addressed the question of whether
petitioners' expectation of privacy had been vio-
lated.44 He noted that standing might be predi-
cated upon the fact that, under the rule in Terry v.
Ohio, the petitioners had been seized. 45 This would
arguably allow petitioners to contest the seizure of
the rifle and shells as fruits of an illegal stop,
though that stop would only have to be justified
by the existence of reasonable suspicion,46 not prob-
able cause.
4 7
White briefly noted that Jones had conferred
3 439 U.S. at 155 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 36
supra.
40 439 U.S. at 155-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 157-58 (White, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 159 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 42;
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. at 216;
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Husty v.
United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931)).
4439 U.S. at 158 (White, J., dissenting).
4Id. at 159.
5 Id. at 160 n.5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968),
was extended to autos in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at




Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1971); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 160 n.5 (White, J.,
dissenting). See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,896-
97 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
at 269.
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automatic standing in a situation where a defend-
ant was charged with a possessory crime. This
presented the defendant with the dilemma of as-
serting ownership of contraband in order to estab.
lish fourth amendment standing, an admission that
might be used to convict him. The prosecution, on
the other hand, would assert, for fourth amend-
ment purposes, that defendant did not own the
contraband, but did possess it for purposes of com-
mitting the crime.4 8 White concluded that it was
an open question whether automatic standing was
still a valid doctrine.4 9
White pointed to Jones as holding that a "legiti-
mate presence"on the premises automatically es-
tablished a legitimate expectation of privacy.
5
0
White defended this standard, accusing the major-
ity of requiring a property interest to establish
standing.s ' He found this inconsistent with case
law holding that an owner experienced no fourth
amendment violation when a nonowningjoint user
of property consented to a search.5 2 White charac-
terized the Court's privacy test as too ambiguous.
Unlike the "bright line" drawn by the legitimate-
presence test, a balancing test based upon expec-
tation of privacy would not provide a clear guide-
line for checking police actions.53
White also claimed that the majority's test was
unfaithful to the fourth amendment.54 The new
rule would cause an increase in illegal automobile
stops and searches since the police would know
passengers could not object to those stops. This
would decrease the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule. For these reasons, White thought
petitioners should have been granted standing to
assert fourth amendment rights.
"
ANALYSIS OF RAKAS
Petitioners* invitation to the Court to extend
standing to the target of a search and seizure had
only minimal support in past decisions. Petitioners
relied upon language in Jones v. United Statess im-
plying that anyone against whom a search anc
48 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 160 n.6 (White, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 228;
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390.
:'439 U.S. at 162 (White, J., dissenting).
U:.dsee note 29 supra.
, 439 U.S. at 163 & n.I I (WhiteJ, dissenting) (citing
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169, 171 n.7
(1974); Frazier v. Culp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969)).
' Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 166 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
54Id. at 168 n.2 1.
"Id. at 167-69.
" 362 U.S. at 267.
seizure was directed might have standing to contest
it. The Court in Jones never intended to set the
stage for such a broad measure of standing. It held
that defendant had standing under a theory of
"legitimate presence," or alternatively, under a
theory of automatic standing for one charged with
a possessory crime.
57
Petitioners' reliance upon Bumper v. North Caro-
linas was also illplaced. There, the house where
defendant lived was illegally searched.5 9 Though
the Court referred to the "target" language ofJones,
the facts of Bumper fit well within the bounds of
the "legitimate expectation of privacy" rule and
the Court never really addressed the applicability
of a "target" rule for standing. 0
The concept of a "target" rule first appeared in
Justice Fortas' concurring and dissenting opinion
in Alderman v. United States.6' Justice Fortas offered
a reasoned opinion, detailing the advantages of a
"target" rule. He raised the specter of unchecked
violation of fourth amendment rights by the gov-
ernment in the absence of such a rule,6" but dis-
missed the extensive precedent emphasizing the
personal nature of fourth amendment riglits" as
the result of a mistaken confusion of the fourth
with the fifth amendment. 6
4
Whether mistaken or not, the personal nature of
fourth amendment rights is not a doctrine which
should be taken lightly. As the Court noted in
Rakas, there is no reason to think that those whose
rights are violated will not defend them in either-
criminal or civil proceedings.s More importantly,
what would happen if parties were allowed to
r'7 Id. at 263-64, 267. The Court in Rakas was correct,
therefore, when it asserted that petitioners were quoting
words from Jones out of context in order to advance their
"target" theory. See 439 U.S. at 135.
' 391 U.S. at 548 n. 11.
59 1d. at 546.
60 Id. at 548 n. 11; ef. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968) (expectation of privacy in union office shared with
others); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(expectation of privacy in phone booth), both decided
about the same time.
6' Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 201 (Fortas,
J., concurring and dissenting). The Court in Rakas cited
the majority opinion in Alderman as "impliedly" rejecting
the "target" theory, but this claim must have been based
more on the existence of Justice Fortas' separate opinion
than upon any other factor in Alderman. 439 U.S. at 136.
S,, note 17 ,pra.
b-2 394 U.S. at 201 (Fortas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
6See note 15 supra.
6 394 U.S. at 204-05 (Fortas, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
6 439 U.S. at 134.
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vicariously assert fourth amendment rights? Could
the resolution of a third-party suit prejudice a later
assertion of those same rights by the person whose
expectation of privacy was actually invaded? If so,
the person might be harmed unnecessarily if the
third party did not do as good a job of protecting
the individual's rights as the individual would have
himself. If not, the same rights might be litigated
many times by different people, possibly resulting
in contrary decisions on the same facts.
Petitioners convincingly argued that the target
theory's wider exclusionary rule would better deter
fourth amendment violations. However, the
Court was on solid precedential ground when it
employed a balancing test, weighing the deterrent
benefits of such a rule against the social costs of a
heavily burdened court system. 67 "'[T]he applica-
tion of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.'" This sentiment has been
expressed consistently by the Court in recent years
as it has wrestled with the problem of ensuring law
and order without restricting personal freedom.s6
The Court's decision in Rakas, however, did de-
part from past precedent in search and seizure law
to some extent. The Court discarded "legitimate
presence" as a factor determinative of standing to
assert fourth amendment rights and retreated to
the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test upon
which the "legitimate presence" standard had been
based. This legitimate expectation of privacy test
was outlined in Katz v. United States,7 ° where the
Court identified the test for fourth amendment
standing as whether the government action "vio-
lated the privacy upon which... [defendant] justi-
fiably relied .... " The test was used consistently
in the intervening years, 71 the Court sometimes
holding that certain facts indicated a legitimate
expectation of privacy and thus established stand-
ing. The Court recognized legitimate expectations
of privacy in private conversations involving the
r6 Id. at 132-33.
6 Id. at 134 n.3. See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. at 275-76.
68 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 134 n.3 (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
69 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 275-76;
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486; United States v. Cal-
andra, 414 U.S. at 348-50; Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. at 174-75; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
at 390. But cf United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at
356-57 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (purpose of exclusionary
tile isnot deterrence, it isjustice).
70 389 U.S. at 353.
71 See cases cited in note 28 supra.
defendant,72 in premises where the defendant had
a possessory or property interest, 73 and in a double-
locked footlocker,7 4 while rejecting allegations of
legitimate expectations of privacy in information
open to public view.7 5 Though it preceded much
of the expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence, the
"legitimate presence" of Jones was viewed as an-
other of these situations where privacy would be
legitimately expected.7 6 Throughout the same pe-
riod of time, the Court continually stressed the
personal (not vicarious) nature of fourth amend-
ment standing7 and its lack of reliance upon tra-
ditional concepts of tort and property law,78 thus
illustrating the fourth amendment's protection of
personal privacy. Hence, it was surprising to see the
Court discard the "legitimate presence" test in
Rakas.
In Jones v. United States,7 the Court held that
"anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a
motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to
be used against him." Alternatively, the Court held
that a person charged with a possessory offense had
automatic standing to object to a search and sei-
zure of the articles forming the basis for the posses-
sory offense.80 In Rakas, the Court virtually ignored
the automatic standing holding,' and when peti-
tioners claimed standing because they were "legit-
imately on [the] premises," it rejected that rule as
too broad, ignoring intervening cases that cited it
as good law.82
Eight years after Jones, in Simmons v. United
States,s3 Bumper v. North Carolina,s4 and Mancusi v.
DeForte,s5 the Court still referred to the "legitimate
presence" rule. The doctrine was not the basis for
standing in any of those cases, yet it was cited with
approval by all of them. Brown v. United States s
decided in 1973, considered the "legitimate pres-
,2 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 176.
73 Id.; Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. at 227. See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 492.
7' United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
75 Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
416 U.S. at 865.
76 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 161 (White, J.,
dissenting).77 See cases cited in note 15 supra.
78 See note 29 supra.
-9 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
80 Id. at 263-64.
8' 439 U.S. at 135 n.4.
82 Id. at 142-43.
83 390 U.S. at 390.
"43 9 1 U.S. at 548 n.ll.
"5 392 U.S. at 368.
m 411 U.S. at 229.
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ence" rule as a test for standing, but rejected its
use because defendants in Brown had not been
present at the search and seizure. That was the last
time, prior to Rakas, that the test was cited by the
Court.
Nonetheless, the Rakas Court's reasons for elim-
inating the "legitimate presence" rule were basi-
cally sound. It is difficult to justify granting stand-
ing to anyone who just "happens" to be on the
premises when a search occurs. Unlike a "legiti-
mate presence" rule, a simple question of whether
a legitimate expectation of privacy was violated
might better avoid reliance upon traditional tort
and property law concepts.87 That way, one is not
asserting that he should have fourth amendment
standing simply because he had permission from
the owner to be there. He is claiming standing
because he reasonably believed that his privacy
would not be violated.ss A rule based directly upon
privacy is more faithful to the spirit of the fourth
amendment because it does not rest standing upon
the chance physical location of a person at any
given time, but upon the degree of privacy a person
legitimately can expect. There often will be a
correlation between property owned and privacy
expected, but unlike a "legitimate presence" rule,
the question of privacy is at the forefront, where it
belongs. In Rakas, petitioners certainly had a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in their own persons,8
but there is no reason why they should have such
an expectation in articles they did not claim to
own or have an interest in.
The alternative basis of standing found in Jones,
automatic standing to contest a search and seizure
for one charged with a possessory crime,90 has not
been invoked often, but offers a logical answer to
a thorny question. The Court in Jones was con-
cerned with two things: that a defendant not be
made to admit to the essential element of a posses-
sory offense-possession-in order to establish
standing9' and that the government not be allowed
87 See note 29 supra.
' Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (two-part test: whether subjectively ex-
pected privacy to be invaded and whether such 1'-lief
was reasonable).
89 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
90 362 U.S. at 263.
9' Id. at 261-62. The opinion noted that this might
cause a defendant to perjure himself, claiming possession
for purposes of standing and denying it for purposes of
the possessory charge. Cf Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. at 398 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (rule
against introduction of pretrial testimony of ownership
for standing purposes encourages defendant to falsely
allege ownership).
to argue contradictorily that defendant did not
possess the seized articles for purposes of establish-
ing standing, but did for purposes of proving the
crime. 2 The Court resolved this dilemma by allow-
ing automatic standing in such a situation.
This dilemma of Jones was addressed extensively
in Simmons v. United States,93 where, at a pretrial
hearing defendant claimed ownership of a suitcase
containing evidence of a robbery in order to estab-
lish fourth amendment standing, only to have that
testimony introduced against him at trial. Relying
upon the reasoning ofJones, the Simmons Court held
that such testimony was not admissible at trial.'
Whether this new rule against admissibility re-
placed the automatic standing of Jones was not
addressed. The defendant's dilemma was solved,
but the government's ability to allege contradicto-
rily possession and nonpossession by the defendant
at the same time was not limited. The question of
the "automatic standing" rule's continued viability
was specifically reserved in Brown v. United States,
95
and in Rakas, the majority and dissenting opinions
gave the issue only passing notice.s9
If the facts in Rakos fall within any concept, it is
the "automatic standing" rule of Jones. However,
both petitioners and the Court ignored this rule.
The fact situation was quite similar to Jones:
charged with a possessory offense, 97 petitioners were
denied standing to contest a seizure because they
did not admit ownership of the articles that would
insure their conviction. The reasoning of the Court
in Jones is just as valid today. Presumably what
petitioners should have done was admit ownership
in a pretrial proceeding, under the rule in Simmons.
However, since they did not, the Court should have
invoked the automatic standing rule of Jones. Pos-
sibly the Court in Rakas thought the expectation of
privacy test left no room for an exception like
automatic standing.
9,2 362 U.S. at 263-65.
93 390 U.S. at 380. Cf United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. at 50-52 (defendant claimed ownership of contra-
band to establish standing).
9 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 389-90.
9" 411 U.S. at 228. The Court in Rakas was faced with
the same situation as in Simmons. The defendant in Sim-
mons asserted ownership when he should have kept quiet
and asked for automatic standing. The Court rescued
him from his folly by suppressing his pretrial testimony.
In Rakas, petitioners failed to assert ownership as they
should have under Simmons, but the Court did not rescue
them from their folly.
9 439 U.S. at 135 n.4; id. at 160 n.6 (White, J.,
dissenting).





The Court's failure to apply the automatic
standing rule ofJones in Rakas is important to note.
It is ironic that a defendant can be convicted on
the strength of his possession of a weapon used in
a crime, but has no standing to contest seizure of
the weapon because he has not admitted possession.
Viewed in its most favorable light, Rakas stands as
a warning to the defendant to assert ownership of
any seized item if he expects to be able to suppress
its use against him. His testimony asserting own-
ership could then be suppressed under the holding
in Simmons. However, if the outcome in Rakas is to
be taken as an indication that the dilemma argu-
ment is no longer persuasive, then Simmons may no
longer be good law. In that event, a defendant
charged with possession would find it impossible to
establish standing without incriminating himself.
He might challenge the seized item as the fruit of
an illegal search, but in order to gain fourth
amendment standing, he would have to make the
difficult showing of an invasion of his own legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.
The Court's expectation of privacy analysis was
surprising in that it rejected "legitimate presence"
as determinative of standing. This decreases the
scope of fourth amendment protection, but the
decrease is more potential than real. The "legiti-
mate presence" rule had not been exploited by the
Court to the extent it could have been and thus
does not represent that much of a loss in real
terms.9
The Court's rejection of "legitimate presence"
can be seen as a shift toward a pure balancing test
for resolving fourth amendment issues. The "bright
line" of legitimate presence has been discarded,
forcing the defendant to rely upon a more ambig-
uous "expectation of privacy" test. This will put
more emphasis on the fact situation of a particular
case and require the Court to weigh the numerous
competing variables on a balancing test. There are
still a few "bright line" indications of expectation
of privacy that can be invoked.99 However, Rakas
may be a warning that these factors no longer hold
the importance they once did. The "legitimate
expectation of privacy" balancing test may now
reign supreme in fourth amendment standing.
DELAWARE V. PROUSE
An automobile owned and occupied by respon-
dent was stopped by an officer for a routine license
See text accompanying notes 77-86 supra.
99 See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
and registration check. The officer had observed
no traffic or equipment violations prior to the stop,
and was not following guidelines or procedures set
by his superiors in conducting the arbitrary stop.
The officer smelled marijuana smoke as he was
walking toward the car, ordered occupants out,
and then seized marijuana in plain view or the
car's floor. Respondent was indicted for illegal
possession of a controlled substance and moved to
suppress admission of the marijuana as the fruit of
an illegal seizure.10° The trial court granted the
motion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
on the grounds that "a random stop of a motorist
in the absence of specific articulable facts which
justify the stop by indicating a reasonable suspicion
that violation of the law has occurred is constitu-
tionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."'01
On review, Justice White, who had dissented in
Rakas, wrote the majority opinion, expressing the
view of eight members of the Court. The majority
first determined that review by the Court was not
precluded by the state court's reliance upon the
Delaware Constitution to invalidate the seizure.
The Delaware Supreme Court had used fourth
amendment cases to decide Prouse, recognizing that
under Mapp v. Ohio, the state constitution was to
be construed to provide at least as much protection
as the fourth amendment. 02 Therefore, the Court
concluded, the Delaware Supreme Court had not
independently rested its decision upon the Dela-
ware Constitution, and the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to review its decision. 1°3
Justice White reasoned for the Court that stop-
ping an automobile and detaining its occupants
does constitute a seizure under the fourth amend-
ment. 1°4 He -noted that the fourth amendment was
designed to protect individual privacy from unrea-
sonable intrusions by the government.'0 5 The rea-
sonableness of a particular search and seizure can
be determined "by balancing its intrusion on the
'
0 2Delaware v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del.
1978).
101 Id. at 1364.
12 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1395 (citing Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). See also State v.
Moore, 187 A.2d 807 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963).
'03 99 S. Ct. at 1395.
104 Id. at 1396. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16
(detaining a person short of arrest constitutes a seizure)
extended to automobiles in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
at 146 and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
878.
'
0599 S. Ct. at 1396.
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individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests. ' °" Justice White explained that the facts sup-
porting an intrusion must, however, be measurable
against an "objective standard," either probable
cause or a less stringent test.10 7 This requirement is
designed to make sure an official does not use his
discretion to interfere with an individual's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.sta
In applying such a test, White turned by analogy
to the Court's recent decisions in a series of border
search cases. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the
Court held: "'Except at the border and its func-
tional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences
from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicles contain aliens who may be ille-
gally in the country.""9 Soon afterward, the Court
held in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,"° that stops
without reasonable suspicion may be made at fixed
10' Id. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109;
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555;
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21; Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. at 535. The use of a balancing test in fourth
amendment cases was first developed in a series of ad-
ministrative search and seizure cases. See See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. at 535. To justify building code inspections, the
public interest in enforcing the codes was balanced
against the invasions of privacy occasioned by the inspec-
tions in order to determine whether such inspections were
reasonable. (They were, with a warrant). Id. at 537-38.
Terry was the first nonadministrative case in which a
strict balancing test was employed. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 20-21.
'0799 S. Ct. at 1396.
"0 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-97. Though
the Court asserted that it was trying to foreclose discre-
tionary intrusions by officials, in practice it has not done
a very good job. Allowing an officer to make a limited
stop and search on the basis of reasonable suspicion in
Terry placed a large grant of dis&etionary power in
official hands. Though Terry attempted to place limits on
this power by requiring "specific articulable facts" to
justify the reasonable suspicion, these limits have
amounted to little in practice. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
21. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-
85; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146. The Court may
be able to weigh the relative importance of a governmen-
tal interest in traffic safety, but many of an officer's
grounds for reasonable suspicion are necessarily going to
be highly subjective, and thus difficult to measure and
verify.
"sDelaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (foot-
note omitted)).
"0 428 U.S. at 557.
border patrol checkpoints, because the resultant
intrusion is only minimal. The Court decided that
the intrusion in Prouse was similar to that in Brig-
noni-Ponce. Since both involved a stop by a roving
officer, the physical and psychological intrusion
were thought to be the same."' Hence, the Court
found itself faced with the question of whether
state interests in traffic safety justify a random
stop, though national interests in controlling im-
migration do not.
112
The Court agreed that Delaware had a vital
interest in promoting traffic safety, but thought,
nonetheless, there were better, less intrusive alter-
natives in enforcement than random stops."3 State
requirements for licensing, registration, and insur-
ance were deemed effective enough that spot checks
would make only marginal additions to traffic
safety.114 The Court hypothesized that unqualified
drivers would be more likely to violate traffic laws
and thus would provide officers with reasonable
suspicion for stopping them." 5 Equipment viola-
tions are for the most part observable and, thus,
will also provide reasonable suspicion for a stop.'
Therefore, the Court concluded that considerations
of traffic safety did not justify stops without rea-
sonable suspicion."
7
The Court in Prouse held that:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered,
or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver's license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." 8
Justice White also noted that states might develop
"' 99 S. Ct..at 1398.
112 Id. The Court specifically reserved this question in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 n.8.
"399 S. Ct. at 1398. But see Cady v. Dombroski, 413
U.S. at 447.
14 99 S. Ct. at 1398-99. But see Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting argument that spot checks have a significant
deterrent effect on unlicensed motorists. Id. at 1402-03
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
's 99 S. Ct. at 1399. Rehnquist's response was that the
Court was hampering prevention of accidents, by catch-
ing unqualified drivers after their unsafe conduct has
occurred. Id. at 1402 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1399; cf Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106 (stop for equipment
violation).




less intrusive methods for spot checks or methods
that bind officer discretion. Roadblock-type stops,
weigh-stations, and inspection checkpoints were
offered as examples of permissible methods." 9
Justice Blackmun,joined by Justice Powell, filed
a short concurring opinion clarifying the circum-
stances under which they had joined the majority.
Blackmun stressed that roadblocks and systematic
stops, "such as every 10th car," would not be
precluded by the decision, and that he would not
apply the rationale of the Court to random stops
by game wardens in the exercise of their duties.1
2°
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, applied the
same balancing test as the Court, but determined
that random stops for traffic safety reasons were
justified in the absence of reasonable suspicion.'
21
He took issue with the Court's assumptions con-
cerning traffic safety, which were made in the
absence of empirical evidence, and questioned how
the Court logically could authorize en masse intru-
sions of privacy at roadblocks, but not individual
intrusions by random stops.' 2t Justice Rehnquist
would have held for the state upon the basis that




In Prouse the Court compared the intrusion upon
individual security and privacy interests to legiti-
mate governmental interests advanced by a ran-
dom stop and concluded that the intrusion was not
reasonable. In so doing, the Court faithfully ap-
plied the balancing/reasonableness test it had de-
veloped in a long line of cases.
In Terry v. Ohio,'24 the Court distinguished the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment
from the rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures and stated that, historically, police action
under exigent circumstances had only been subject
to the latter standard. It drew its balancing test for
determining reasonableness from a line of admin-
istrative search and seizure cases,2'2 quoting from
Camara v. Municipal Court:
[It] is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
" Id. at 1401 n.26.
'
1 Id. at 1401 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 1402 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'2 Id. at 1402-03.
2 Id. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election, 394
U.S. 802 (1969).
'2 392 U.S. at 20.
ISee Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 535-
37.
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen," for there is "no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails."
'1 26
The transfer of this test from the sphere of admin-
istrative searches and seizures to use in the analysis
of criminal searches and seizures was successful.
The Court continued to use the test, substantially
unchanged, up to and including its decision in
Prouse.
1 27
An important variable in the balancing test is
the "quantum of individualized suspicion ' 128 jus-
tifying a search and seizure. The Court has re-
quired different levels of individualized suspicion,
depending upon the extent to which individual
privacy and security interests have been invaded
and upon the importance of governmental interests
advanced. These levels of suspicion range from no
suspicion at all t2 9 to reasonable suspicion'30 and
probable cause.13 They are used to justify requests
for warrants as well as warrantless "reasonable"
searches and seizures.1
32
12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534-35, 536-37).
12 See note 106 supra.
'28 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1396 (quoting
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560). See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18.
129 The "plain view" cases may be analogized to this
since once the officer is legitimately in a position to view
contraband, he can seize it without any further justifi-
cation. See note 4 supra, for the inventory and car care
cases where automobiles in police custody may be
searched without a warrant and without showing any
level of individualized suspicion.
130 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
555-56; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 897; United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883; Almeida-San-
chez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 279; Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. at 146; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21.
131 "If the facts and circumstances before the officer
are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in
believing that the offense has been committed, it is
sufficient." Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). See
note 4 supra.
132 Probable cause must be shown to obtain a normal
search warrant. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). To
justify an administrative search warrant the less stringent
test of whether "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular [establishment]," is used.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 538). Cf Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 283 (Powell,
J., concurring) (suggesting issuance of "area" warrants
for border searches).
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The reasonable suspicion standard used in Prouse
first appeared in Terry. Prior to this, a standard
"less stringent" than probable cause was employed
in administrative search and seizure cases to justify
the issuance of search warrants,ss but no standard
less than probable cause had been applied for a
warrantless search not falling under one of the
traditional exceptions to the search warrant rule. t1 4
Teny was a response to Mapp v. Ohio135 and its
application of the fourth amendment to the states.
For the first time, "stop and frisk" tactics tradition-
ally employed hy the police were subject to review
under the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
'The Court in Terry held that:
[Wihere a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous... he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
This standard was broadened in Adams v. Wil-
liams,'37 where the Court ruled that an officer
relying solely upon facts supplied by an informant
had reasonable suspicion for conducting a weapons
search. The rulings in Terry and Adams that deten-
tion of a person constituted a seizure under the
fourth amendment were later extended to auto-
mobile stops in the border-search cases.lss
The Court has taken a step-by-step approach in
analyzing automobile search and seizure cases, ex-
amining each case on its facts, and incrementally
'33 Q, note 132 supra.
i'3 See note 4 supra.
us 367 U.S. at 30.
'36 392 U.S. at 30.
'37 407 U.S. at 146-47. An officer was told by an
informant that a man sittingin a car possessed heroin
and was armed. The officer proceeded to the car and
asked the defendant to get out. When he rolled down the
window instead, the officer reached in and seized the
gun, and arrested him. Id. at 145. There was strenuous
objection to extension of the rule of Terry. Besides allowing
the officer to rely upon an informant, Adams involved a
possessory offense without the potential for violence that
so worried the Court in Terry. See Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warning of
dangers of permitting a detention and search on less than
probable cause).
'38 See note 104 supra.
expanding fourth amendment law to cover those
facts. The Court used this method to analyze Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States,'3 9 United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce,140 United States v. Ortiz,14i United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,"' Pennsylvania v. Mimms,143 and most
recently, Prouse.'" Prouse fits well within the ana-
lytical framework of this progression of cases. Due
to its emphasis on a balancing test and on a case-
by-case analysis of the facts, the Court has made
no broad rulings either expanding or contracting
the protections provided in auto search and seizure
cases. The holding in Prouse was predictable, how-
ever, since its facts were so similar to Brignoni-Ponce,
the only prior instance of a stop by a roving patrol
car for no articulable reason.
145
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER PROUSE
The outcome of a future case, factually dissimilar
from past decisions, is difficult to predict. The
governmental and individual interests weighed by
the Court's balancing test are almost impossible to
quantify. Past cases give a good idea of which
arguments should be made in an auto search and
seizure case, and an even better idea of how they
should be made, but they offer no guide for deter-
mining the weight those arguments will be given.
"9 In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at
273, the Court held that border patrol officers needed
some sort of individualized suspicion to make a roving
stop and search of an automobile.
'40 The Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. at 883, required that a border patrol officer have
reasonable suspicion for a stop.
14' In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896-97, the
Court held that probable cause must be shown for a
search at a fixed border patrol checkpoint.
142 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
562, the Court ruled that no suspicion need be shown to
stop an automobile at a fixed border patrol checkpoint.
43 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112, a non-
border case, included a stop for an equipment violation
and a subsequent order to the driver to get out. The
Court held that once an officer had shown an individu-
alized suspicion sufficient to justify the stop, he could
order the driver out of the car without any further
showing of suspicion.
'44The balancing/reasonableness test lends itself
rather well to this case-by-case analysis. It would be
almost impossible to adopt an incremental approach,
distinguishing each case on its facts, if the Court were to
apply a broad rule.
'45 Actually there was an articulable reason: the auto-
mobile in Brignoni-Ponce contained persons who appeared
to be of Mexican descent. However, the Court held that
this did not constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop.
422 U.S. at 886.
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Procedures for oversight will have to be devel-
oped to ensure that the essentially subjective deter-
mination of reasonable suspicion not be abused. It
seems probable that the Court will consider stops
without reasonable suspicion at roadblocks as rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment.'" The Court
also implied in Prouse that "two-stage" checkpoint
stops where "some vehicles may be subject to fur-
ther detention for safety and regulatory inspec-
tion," will be held constitutional. 47 States possibly
could build turn-offs from major roads similar to
weigh stations, but intended for license checks. The
Court specifically limited its decision so that weigh
stations would not be affected." a However, this did
not answer the question of whether semi-trailer
trucks may be randomly stopped to check their
licenses and weight papers. The states have legiti-
mate interests in the regulation and safety of the
trucking industry not applicable to other vehicles.
The Court encouraged the states to develop less
intrusive methods ofspot checking that would limit
individual officers' discretion. 49 Stopping every
tenth car to pass a given point, as suggested by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, might
fit these guidelines.' 50 A systematic roving patrol,
such as having individual officers stop all cars with
a license number ending in a particular digit,
might fail the constitutional test since motorists
might not see others being stopped and thus suffer
the greater fear of being singled out for inspec-
tion. 15 1 Perhaps groups of patrol cars under admin-
istrative direction could be used to stop long lines
of cars for traffic checks. Whatever systematic
methods are used, controls should be instituted to
make sure they are followed by officers. It is possi-
ble that systematic methods may not be as effective
as random stops in promoting traffic safety. A rise
'46 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1401 & n.26; cf.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563 (fixed
border checkpoints are permissible).141799S. Ct. at 1401 n.26.
14
8 Id.
" Id. at 1401.
50lId. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
51 Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1397-98 and
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895 (fear caused by
stop invades individual privacy).




Though Rakas and Prouse involved wholly differ-
ent issues in fourth amendment law, they are in-
structive when treated in common. They provide
an effective illustration of the procedure currently
employed by the Court to analyze fourth amend-
ment issues.
Rakas revealed the Court's preoccupation with a
fourth amendment balancing test. The Court dis-
carded a "bright line" test of legitimate presence
to establish standing and instead required use of
the more ambiguous test of legitimate expectation
of privacy. This shift toward a balancing test made
Rakas appear to signal a change in judicial philos-
ophy toward search and seizure law. However, it is
the mode of analysis which has changed, not the
substantive scope of the fourth amendment.
In both Rakas and /rouse, numerous peculiarities
of the factual situation were examined and weighed
to determine whether legitimate- expectations of
privacy had been invaded. The lessened protection
afforded automobiles and the level of individual-
ized suspicion justifying the invasions were factors
in these determinations. In Rakas the Court deter-
mined that there was no invasion of privacy, so
petitioners lacked standing. However, in Prouse,
standing was established since respondent's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy was invaded. The
Court then determined the extent to which the
legitimate expectation of privacy had been invaded
and balanced that value against the governmental
interests justifying the intrusion. The Court de-
cided the balance was unreasonable and thus vio-
lated the fourth amendment.
Rakas and Prouse thus actually demonstrate the
consistency with which the Court is now analyzing
fourth amendment cases. The same analytical
method was employed in both cases; together they
offer a prime example of the current Court's objec-
tive balancing analysis unencumbered by predilec-
tions of the legitimate scope of governmental
searches and seizures.
1'2 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. at 1402 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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